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The Employment Act of 1946: 
A Half Century of Experience 
by Murray Weidenbaum 
The first half century of experience under the Employment Act of 1946 (originally the Full 
Employment Bill of 1945) likely has disappointed both the proponents and the opponents of that 
innovative law. The impact on national economic policy is neither as bad as the opposition feared nor as 
substantial as the sponsors had hoped. 
Viewed in the most fundamental light, however, the legislation has been successful: the two 
institutions the 1946 act established are still in operation and the act's then-controversial statement of 
policy has become accepted as part of the federal government's bureaucratic fabric. A substantial 
government responsibility for the overall performance of the American economy is now widely assumed. 
In fact, politicians of the opposition party readily hold the administration in office accountable for 
whatever economic shortcomings occur. 
The Council of Economic Advisers 
Of the two organizations established by the 1946 act- the Joint Economic Committee (JEC) 
and the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA)- the council has tended to be the more visible and 
perhaps more influential, but it has traversed a very rocky path. 
Formally, the CEA has little power. It is a very modest-sized constituent unit of the Executive 
Office of the President, dwarfed in number of employees and budget by the Office of Management and 
Budget, the National Security Council, and the U.S. Trade Representative Office. The council's only 
statutory functions are to give the president economic advice (of course, he is under no compulsion to 
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follow it) and to help the president write the annual economic report. Early on, the formal presidential 
report became a very short and rather political summary communicating the annual report of the Council 
of Economic Advisers. The latter comprises the bulk of the document, including both substantial 
analyses of economic issues and a widely used compendium of statistical data. 
The first chairman, Edwin Nourse (who came from a very different Brookings Institution than 
today), tended to view the council's role in a rather purist sense, limited to providing professionally and 
essentially nonpartisan information. The Nourse council was more an adornment than a participant in 
the government's policymaking process. 
As Nourse wrote to President Truman in accepting the position, "There is no occasion for the 
council to become involved in any way in the advocacy of particular measures." Nourse conceived of 
the council as "a scientific agency." The second chairman ( attorney Leon Keyser! in g) took the opposite 
extreme and tried to play a very partisan role as an active member of President Truman's team. 
The Republican Congress that soon after took over reacted very adversely to the Keyserling 
approach. It initially refused to appropriate any money for the CEA and the council went out of 
existence in early 1953. In an episode that few recall, Arthur Bums, the CEA chairman-designate, was 
appointed economic adviser in the Eisenhower White House. The CEA employees became White House 
staff for the period. In one of his unheralded accomplishments, Bums convinced the skeptical Congress 
that he would conduct a highly professional operation and the CEA's appropriation was restored. True to 
his word, Burns avoided public controversy. Even his official testimony to congressional committees 
was given in closed executive session. 
CEA chairmen and members since have taken a more activist and public role. Yet they have 
tried to avoid the two extremes of the Truman administration so as not to be pegged as either advocate or 
oracle. Political constraints, of course, color the language of every CEA Economic Report. As stated by 
the Council of Economic Advisers in its March 6, 1961, testimony to the Joint Economic Committee: 
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The Council has a responsibility to explain to the Congress and to the public the general 
economic strategy of the President's program, especially as it relates to the objectives of 
the Employment Act ... . It is not appropriate or necessary for the Council to go into the 
details of legislative proposals or of Administrative actions which fall primarily in the 
domain of operating Executive departments or agencies .... 
The influence of the CEA has ebbed and flowed. Soon after leaving the CEA, Nourse wrote 
"the actual position of the Council has undergone such progressive attrition or debasement that it bids 
fair soon to be negligible." Yet, perhaps a golden age was reached in the early 1960s during the 
chairmanship of Walter Heller in the Kennedy administration- a time when the council preached the 
gospel of the new economics. 
To a degree, the success of the Heller council has bedeviled its successors. By demonstrating the 
important role that could be played by economists at the highest levels of government, its achievements 
encouraged the various cabinet departments to upgrade existing economics staffs and to set up new 
positions of undersecretary or assistant secretary for economics. Enhanced employment opportunities 
for economists are an attractive prospect. In this case, however, it meant a new form of competition for 
the CEA in presenting its views in the inner councils of the government. It also made possible a 
cacophony of administration economists, at times confusing the public as to where the administration 
stood on a given issue. 
The recent past provided another period of uncertainty as to the future of the CEA. In an action 
reminiscent of the 1953 experience, in 1995 the House of Representatives refused to pass the 
appropriation for the CEA. The council, however, continued to operate on the basis of temporary 
funding, and a regular appropriation has recently passed. The new chairman (a distinguished economist 
from Stanford University, Joseph Stiglitz) seems to be taking a low public profile, although not quite as 
self-effacing as did Arthur Bums. It is interesting to note that when the CEA's future was being debated 
in 1995, every active Republican ex-chairman came to the defense of the CEA as well as the Democratic 
economists who served on the council. 
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The universal feeling in the profession is that the council plays a unique and important role. Of 
course, it is the profession's key window into Washington. Far more important, the CEA is a source of 
professional advice to the president from a group that has little, if any, special-interest baggage; thus, it 
can serve as a proxy for the public interest. The CEA does more than provide up-to-date statistics. It 
examines controversial issues of public policy from the viewpoint of the president rather than a 
specialized department. 
To some extent, it is a tribute to the power of mainstream economic analysis to note that, on a 
great many issues, the work of Democratic and Republican councils is interchangeable. With the fewest 
exceptions, the CEA can be counted on to present the serious arguments against subsidies (whether to 
business, labor, or agriculture), against restrictions on foreign trade, against outmoded regulation of 
industry, and against inefficient social regulation that fails to pass a benefit-cost test. Indeed, I have 
called the CEA a damage-limitation mechanism. But, also predictably, the council is steadfast in favor 
of economic incentives and competition in the marketplace as the most effective ways of achieving high 
levels of economic welfare. 
Without the large staff support available to department heads who promote specific programs, 
the task of the CEA is not an easy one. Posing difficult problems of choice to a president constantly 
bombarded with easy answers is surely a challenging assignment. The council does not win all the 
battles it wages, nor does it lose them all. We can take some solace in the observation of the late Arthur 
Okun, a former CEA chairman. He noted that economists can coexist with politicians in the same 
manner that lambs coexist with lions; you need a big supply of lambs. 
joint Economic Committee 
The other institution set up by the Employment Act of 1946 is located in the legislative branch 
and was originally called the Joint Committee on the Economic Report. True to its name, it held 
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hearings on the president's economic report and issued its findings. It has no authority to vote on 
legislation. 
The committee gradually expanded its purview - to hold hearings and commission studies on a 
wide variety of economic matters. After a while, the current title - the Joint Economic Committee-
was adopted to reflect its broader range of activities. 
Indeed, some of the hearings, committee reports, and compendia issued by the committee have 
been influential in generating public and congressional support for reforms in a variety of areas -
monetary and fiscal policy, international economics, defense procurement, taxation, and budget matters. 
Although never nonpartisan, the JEC, in its earlier years, tended to focus on specific issues of 
economic policy that transcended party positions. While continuing its tradition of sponsoring 
professional economic analysis, the activities of the committee in recent years seem to reflect more fully 
the party in power in the house that selects the chairman (which is rotated between the Senate and the 
House ofRepresentatives). 
A special development may have led to this situation. The establishment of separate committees 
on the budget in each house resulted in a new forum where economic policies can be debated and, very 
telling, in a committee that has the power to report out the important budget resolutions. Thus, the new 
budget committees have become a powerful competitor to the JEC as a place where key legislators and 
senior government officials can debate the major issues of economic policy. Nevertheless, the Joint 
Economic Committee remains the only institution in the Congress which focuses its interests on 
economics- and one of the few where members of both houses interact regularly. 
The Policy Declaration in the 1946 Act 
At the time of its enactment, most of the debate on the Employment Act focused on the long-
winded declaration of policy. That long and run-on sentence reads in part: 
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... that it is the continuing policy and responsibility of the Federal Government to use 
all practical means consistent with ... other essential considerations of national policy ... 
to coordinate and utilize all its plans, functions, and resources ... to promote ma.ximum 
employment, production, and purchasing power. 
The prevailing Keynesian orientation of the times focused on macroeconomic - and especially 
fiscal - policy, reflecting the desire to avoid the large-scale unemployment of the 1930s. Little 
attention was given either to inflation or monetary policy or microeconomic issues (such as regulation, 
trade practices, etc.). The Policy Declaration did contain- among a great many other statements of 
concern and interest - a sop to the supporters of private sector responsibilities. All the good things 
done under the Employment Act are to be accomplished "in a manner calculated to foster and promote 
free competitive enterprise and the general welfare." 
The debates of the 1960s and 1970s on the relative effectiveness of monetary policy and fiscal 
policy changed the basic focus of economic policy in the United States. The Federal Reserve Bank is 
now looked to as the primary mechanism for achieving short-term economic stability, while tax and 
budget policies are viewed in terms of the longer-run impacts on investment, economic growth, and 
income distribution. 
In an interesting informal but universal reinterpretation, the reference in the Employment Act to 
"purchasing power" has been cited as the basis for government concerning itself with controlling 
inflation. Subsequently, the Humphrey-Hawkins Act of 1978 formally added the goal of eliminating 
inflation. The original primary emphasis on "maximum employment" -which was a legislative 
compromise to break the deadlock over the more controversial term "full employment" - has generally 
taken a back seat in federal economic priorities. Perhaps this is a compliment to the flexible language of 
the legislation. More basically, the new emphasis may reflect changing national priorities resulting from 
the nation's success in avoiding the massive unemployment of the 1930s and earlier periods. 
The 1982 Economic Report highlighted the growing tendency to give greater weight to the limits 
of the effective role of government in the economy. For example, the mainstream of the economics 
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profession now believes that government efforts to intervene directly in wage and price decisionmaking 
in the private sector are usually ineffective or inefficient. Moreover, government cannot fully anticipate 
the future course of the economy. In this view, neither can government direct economic outcomes with 
any degree of precision. 
Annual economic reports, by advisers to Democratic and Republican presidents, usually now 
contain one or more chapters on microeconomic issues. Typically, these sections of the report focus on 
government regulation of private economic activity. It seems that we currently have a more appropriate 
opportunity to raise once again the subject of employment. What I have in mind is in the spirit of the 
opening policy declaration of the Employment Act but consistent with a more modem interpretation. 
Thus, I hope that, in the near future, a section of the council's report attempts to link the earlier 
concern with achieving "ma."Ximum employment" with the current emphasis on improving economic 
efficiency. Specifically, I urge some long overdue attention to a phenomenon that we can call "the 
discouraged employer." This would deal with the many aspects of government regulation and ancillary 
activity that discourage employers from directly adding to their payrolls. 
For example, the effort to shield smaller businesses from often byzantine regulation of the 
workplace has resulted in the creation of serious barriers to expansion of an organization's work force. 
Thus, some employers are on record that they will avoid hiring their 50th worker because of the onerous 
regulations that would be triggered by that otherwise desirable action. Such governmental obstacles to 
"maximum employment" do serve the attention of both of the agencies created by the Employment Act. 
Conclusion 
Taken as a whole, the Employment Act of 1946 has turned out to be a durable contribution to 
government policymaking in the United States. From its passage, it signaled the notion that national 
economic policymaking is a continuing function of the federal government. That this proposition is so 
commonly accepted a's a matter of fact is a tribute to the workings of this compromise legislation. 
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Similarly, the fact that the two organizations established by the 1946 act- the Council of Economic 
Advisers and the Joint Economic Committee - are alive if not well underscores the point. 
After half a century, should the legislation be revised? Personally, I think not. The experience 
of the Humphrey-Hawkins Bill is compelling. In effect, that was an attempt to expand the 1946 
legislation into a commitment to undertake national economic planning on a formal basis. In practice, 
the compromise (enacted as the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978) was a hodgepodge 
of wishful thinking and special interest pleading but without any real teeth in it. In recent years, the 
Council of Economic Advisers has ignored or soft-pedaled the mandate to forecast all the good things 
required by the law and particularly to set numerical goals for key economic indicators over a five-year 
horizon. Nobody seems to have missed that wheelspinning exercise. 
As required by the act, the Federal Reserve does testify before the banking committees of the 
Congress, presenting the required target range for monetary policy and economic performance. But little 
attention is paid to those numbers. There is no effort by the Congress or the Fed to look back and even 
note the extent to which actual Fed policy differed from the forecasts, much less ask why. A simple 
repeal of the Humphrey-Hawkins Act would be a contribution to slimmed down government. 
Having criticized the efforts of liberals to modify the Employment Act, it is only fair to turn 
attention to my fellow conservatives. There is no need to modify the statement of policy with regard to 
the Federal Reserve System. Yes, the Fed should focus its efforts on controlling and subduing inflation. 
Indeed, it does so in the secure knowledge that it is the only effective anti-inflation agency in the federal 
government. 
However, it is just wrong to say that the Fed ignores other aspects of economic activity, such as 
growth and employment- or that it should. Surely, during periods of monetary restraint the system is 
itself restrained by the knowledge that the effects of its actions extend beyond the price indices. The 
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incremental manner in which the Fed reduces (or increases) the discount rate is clear evidence of the care 
with which monetary policy changes are made. 
The problem is that the financial markets react- it is more accurate to say overreact- to any 
statement from anyone in the Federal Reserve System acknowledging the Fed's concern about the 
progress of the real economy. Perhaps it is harmless to continue playing along with that mild case of 
paranoia. Nevertheless, I see no benefit from encouraging that silliness by statutory requirement. 
To conclude: the flexibility of the Employment Act of 1946 is a continuing testament to the 
occasional benefits of compromise. 
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